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Abstract 
 
Did the Comprehensive Assessment (CA), preceding the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
(SSM) launch in Europe, achieve its aims of producing new valuable information for the 
market? We show that the CA achieved the goal of increasing transparency: investors were 
able to detect weak banks at the announcement of the procedure (23rd October 2013), but 
gained full information on the amount of the capital shortfall only at the disclosure of the 
results (26th October 2014). Furthermore, at the official launch of the SSM (4th November 
2014), banks under direct European Central Bank (ECB) supervision registered a more 
negative market reaction with respect to banks maintaining their national supervisors. Using 
a regression model including possible confounders and allowing for treatment effect 
heterogeneity, this negative reaction is confirmed. These findings suggest that, at least in the 
short run, investors penalized banks subject to direct ECB supervision, probably because of 
the fear of regulatory inconsistencies. 
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1. Introduction 
After the financial turmoil triggered by subprime mortgages in summer 2007, the 
systemic risk of European banks increased dramatically, reaching its peak in 
November 2011, with large scale banking rescues occurring in all major EU 
economies (Molyneux et al., 2014). The global financial crisis and the following 
European sovereign debt crisis led policymakers to recognize that the traditional 
micro-prudential approach to financial stability needed to be complemented with a 
system-wide macro-prudential approach (Black et al., 2016). In this context, the 
ECB intervened decisively with both standard and non-standard monetary policy 
interventions, enhancing liquidity conditions to restore the banking system (Ricci, 
2015). The ECB not only adopted exceptional monetary policy measures, but also 
took charge of bank supervision. Recognizing the need for reshaping banking 
supervision (Girardone et al., 2013; Barth et al., 2013; Matousek, 2011; U.S. 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011), the European Commission changed the 
European Banking supervisory system in autumn 2012 by creating a Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) led by the European Central Bank (ECB). 
Specifically, starting from November 4th, 2014, the SSM has involved a transfer to 
the European level of the regulatory and institutional framework responsible for the 
safeguard of the robustness and the stability of the banking industry. The most 
significant 130 banks in 19 countries (representing assets worth €22 trillion, i.e. 82% 
of total banking assets in the Euro zone) now fall under the direct supervision of the 
ECB, while the National Supervisory Authorities (NSAs) maintain the direct 
supervision (in collaboration with the ECB) of the remaining banks.  
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As an essential part of the preparation for the SSM, the ECB and the NSAs 
carried out a Comprehensive Assessment (CA) announced on the October 23rd, 
2013, and completed on October 26th, 2014, in order to “provide the necessary 
clarity on the banks that will be subject to the ECB’s direct supervision” (ECB 
2013, p. 1). Explaining the rationale of the CA, the ECB (2013) underlined that 
supervisors and regulators had already taken many actions to address the adverse 
consequences of the global financial crisis and many banks had already raised new 
capital to reinforce their positions. However, the ECB also stated “weaknesses 
remain, compounded by the perception that banks’ balance sheets are not 
transparent and concerns about their overall risk situation” (ECB, 2013, p. 2). As 
further specified by the ECB (2013, p. 2), “The exercise has three main goals: 
transparency, that is, enhancing the quality of information available concerning the 
condition of banks; repair, by identifying and implementing necessary corrective 
actions, if and where needed; and confidence building, namely assuring all 
stakeholders that banks are fundamentally sound and trustworthy”. 
With respect to other regulatory stress test exercises conducted in Europe or 
in the U.S., the CA is particularly interesting because it was launched as a 
preliminary step for a much larger process, the implementation of the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), with the most significant banking institutions 
falling under direct ECB supervision and the others maintaining national 
supervisors. Although it is true that the SSM consequences may be fully analyzed in 
the long term, it is possible to have a first assessment focusing on stock markets. 
Our paper aims to verify whether the CA reached its main objectives. Specifically, 
we focus on the CA’s aims of increasing transparency and building confidence.  
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Our paper answers the following two questions: did the CA produce new 
valuable information for the market? Did the CA have a positive effect on the stock 
price of involved institutions?  
The main contribution of our paper is that, to our knowledge, it is one of the 
first studies to provide empirical evidence of the market reaction to every single step 
of the CA, and to link this stress exercise to the wider SSM process. Specifically, by 
observing market reaction from the beginning to the end of this procedure, we are 
the first paper to investigate whether the CA really increased transparency and 
confidence in banking, as stated in its aims. Our results have important policy 
implications for supervisors since we shed some light on investors’ perceptions 
about this crucial change in the European banking supervision. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First, we review previous 
studies and develop our research hypotheses (section 2). Second, we run a 
preliminary inspection of market reaction to several CA announcements (section 3), 
and then we discuss our main results about the information produced by this review 
exercise (section 4). Finally, we run further investigation to detect some potential 
SSM effects in investors’ reaction (section 5). Conclusions are drawn in section 6. 
 
 
2. Literature, contribution and hypotheses 
This paper focuses on the first fundamental step of the European supervisory 
architecture revolution, i.e., the Comprehensive Assessment (CA) run in preparation 
of the SSM. As such, we contribute not only to the recent research stream on 
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regulatory stress tests, but also to the more established literature on financial 
stability, bank regulation and supervision. 
The literature on regulatory stress tests performed by European or U.S. 
supervisory authorities has grown fast in the last years, including both theoretical 
and empirical papers. Theoretical studies mainly discuss whether results from 
supervisory stress tests should be disclosed or not. Following Bernanke (2013), the 
disclosure of stress tests results promote transparency by providing investors with 
consistent and comparable information about banks’ financial conditions. Other 
authors recognize the benefits of disclosure, but also point to potential problems 
(Hirtle and Lehnert, 2014; Goldstein and Sapra, 2015), especially the so-called 
Hirshleifer effect (i.e., disclosing too much information destroys risk-sharing 
opportunities and reduces liquidity in the interbank market). Goldstein and Leitner 
(2015) conclude that in time of crisis risk-sharing arrangements are already seriously 
compromised by the general perception that banks are under-capitalized and (partial) 
disclosure of regulatory stress tests becomes optimal and able to produce a 
stabilizing effect. In order to produce this reassuring effect, it is important that 
regulatory stress tests do produce new and valuable information to the market, 
increasing transparency on banks’ financial conditions. A complementary set of 
empirical papers assess market reactions to these regulatory exercises and/or try to 
assess whether or not they were able to increase transparency. 
To our knowledge, only a small number of papers analyze the market 
reaction to the stress tests performed by the U.S. or European supervisory authorities 
(e.g., Candelon and Sy, 2015). Focusing on the U.S., Morgan et al. (2014) find that 
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the 2009 stress test conducted on the 19 largest U.S. bank holding companies 
produced valuable information for the market. Before the results were disclosed, 
investors had already identified weak banks. More in details, the authors 
demonstrate that the market reaction at February 2009 (the so called “date of 
clarification”) is a good predictor for the capital gap disclosed two months later, in 
May 2009 (the so called “date of results”). With the publication of results, investors 
gained information on the size of the capital gap, and banks with larger gaps 
experienced more negative abnormal returns. Dealing with Europe, Petrella and 
Resti (2013) provide evidence that the 2011 European Banking Authority (EBA) 
stress test produced valuable information for the market and investors were not able 
to anticipate its results. They also find that the stock market reacted not only to 
detailed historical data released after the test, but also to indicators of the bank’s 
vulnerability to simulated downturn scenarios. Acharya et al. (2014) compare the 
capital shortfall measured by regulatory stress tests - conducted both in Europe and 
in the U.S. - to that of a benchmark methodology that employs only publicly 
available market data. This alternative methodology assumes a crisis scenario, 
defined by a 40% drop in the market equity index over six months (see Acharya et 
al., 2012). Results show that regulatory stress tests could be more effective using 
capital adequacy definitions based on total assets and market risks, rather than on 
risk weighted assets.  
Not surprisingly, there are very few papers focusing on the market reaction 
to the CA results (e.g., Bank of Italy, 2014; Sahin and de Haan; 2015), due to its 
very recent and fast launch. Bank of Italy (2014) assessed the market reaction to the 
announcement of CA results as follows: “The share prices of the banks for which 
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capital strengthening requirements emerged recorded large losses owing to the 
dilution effect of any capital increases. The risk premiums on the CDS of almost all 
the banks involved in the exercise narrowed in the days immediately following 26 
October, reflecting increased confidence on the part of investors; these 
improvements were subsequently scaled back” (Bank of Italy, 2014, p. 31). Sahin 
and de Haan (2015) run an event study analysis by country finding a strong 
heterogeneity across several Euro area members. 
Our study has a different perspective from the existing papers on the 
European case, since we aim to analyze the market reaction related to the CA, not 
only at the date of the results’ disclosure, but also in each previous intermediate step. 
After the event study analysis, similarly to Morgan et al. (2014), we focus on two 
main dates, the announcement of the procedure and the disclosure of results, 
assuming that the reaction at the announcement date is a measure of the investors’ 
expectations about the results. Consequently, at the announcement date, we expect a 
negative market reaction for treated banks supposed to register a capital shortfall in 
the CA. At the results date, the market reaction is expected to be positive if the 
expected capital shortfall is higher than the realized shortfall disclosed by the ECB, 
or negative otherwise. As a consequence, at the results date, if the stress test 
produces new significant information, it is possible to register both positive and 
negative reactions, depending on previous expectations about every single bank’s 
conditions. At the opposite, if the stress test does not produce new valuable 
information, there are no significant abnormal returns in the stock price of involved 
banks. This is consistent with Flannery et al. (2015) outlining that, when 
announcement dates are known well in advance by investors, as in the case of stress 
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test disclosure of results, their information content must be evaluated in relation to 
the market’s prior beliefs. We believe that the CA was able to produce new 
information, similarly to previous stress tests conducted in the U.S. and in Europe. 
Our first hypothesis is the following: 
H1: At the announcement of the procedure, investors were not able 
to predict the magnitude of the capital shortfall revealed at the results date, 
i.e., the exercise produced valuable information for the market and reached 
the goal of increased transparency.  
With respect to the existing literature on regulatory stress tests, we add a 
further analysis motivated by the specialness of the CA as a first step of the new 
European supervisory architecture. As outlined by Doumpos et al. (2015), the crisis 
re-opened the debate on the optimal supervisory architecture, since theory and 
limited empirical evidence provide mixed results on the effect of Central Banks’ 
independence and involvement in financial supervision. In a second step of our 
paper, we not only consider banks subject to the CA (with a capital shortfall or not), 
but we also consider a control sample of European banks excluded from the 
procedure. In this way, we aim to explore the reaction of banks outside the SSM. 
This sample group allows us to evaluate whether investors were worried only about 
the CA exercise or, more generally, about the change in the supervisory mechanism. 
Although we are aware that the consequences (especially long-term effects) of 
switching from a Multiple Supervisory Mechanism (MSM) to a Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM) will be visible in the medium-long run, the endeavor of our 
analysis is to show that this change has generated immediate reactions in the 
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investors’ behavior since its launch date. This change is expected to be perceived as 
very relevant, even in the short run, for at least three reasons: 1) the fragmentation of 
the European banking sector due to national characteristics (Matousek et al., 2015); 
2) the significant heterogeneity in the supervisory style adopted by different NSAs 
operating in the Euro-area countries (Carretta et al., 2015); and 3) the consensus 
emerged after the financial crisis on the necessity to adopt a more intrusive approach 
to EU bank supervision (e.g., Nouy, 2013).  Our expectation is also based on the 
consideration that the new European SSM has similar features to state charter 
banking in the United States. Agarwal et al. (2014) provide empirical evidence that 
the U.S. regulators in the dual supervisory mechanism implement identical rules 
inconsistently, due to differences in their institutional design and incentives, and that 
this behavior can adversely impact regulatory effectiveness. Of course, this may also 
happen in the new European SSM: investors may have reacted to the launch of the 
SSM by discriminating between banks falling under the direct ECB supervision and 
other banks remaining under the direct NSA supervision. In this case, the goal of 
confidence building may have been hindered by the uncertainty about the severity of 
future scrutiny for different banks. Specifically, our second hypothesis is the 
following: 
H2: When the SSM was launched, investors penalized banks 
subject to the direct ECB supervision with respect to banks maintaining 
national supervisors.      
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3. Did investors react to ECB press releases related to the Comprehensive 
Assessment? 
As a first step, we measure market reaction around all announcements related to the 
Comprehensive Assessment. We collected data for all listed banks in every country 
of the European Union, distinguishing between “treated banks” (i.e., banks subject 
to the CA) and “untreated banks” (i.e., banks not subject to the CA). Since the 
number of listed banks in Europe is quite small, we included in the group of 
“untreated” banks all European listed banks (not only in the Euro area) out of the 
CA and under the direct supervision of NSAs, i.e., both small listed banks in 
countries under the SSM and listed banks in European countries outside the Euro 
area (e.g., the UK). 
Daily stock market data were obtained from Datastream: we restricted our 
selection to major securities (the most traded equity) and primary quotes (not the 
cross-listings). We estimate abnormal returns (ARs) as the difference between actual 
stock returns and expected returns (i.e., those expected in the absence of relevant 
events). Following a common procedure to estimate ARs in banking (e.g., De Long 
and De Young, 2007), we use the market model (MacKinlay, 1997) in which normal 
returns for every i-th observation (Rit) are obtained as a function of the market 
portfolio return (RMt), represented by a world equity index (i.e., the MSCI World 
Index). Market model parameters are obtained with daily log returns of bank stock 
prices over a 252-day estimation period, ending 20 days before the announcement1. 
ARs are then obtained as the difference between the actual stock return and the 
                                                             
1 We drop stock price series that are not complete for the whole estimation period and/or are strongly illiquid.  
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return predicted by the market model. ARs are then cumulated over a time period 
(Cumulative Abnormal Return, CAR) around the announcement date (t=0). 
Following Morgan et al. (2014) and other papers measuring market reaction to 
policy announcements (e.g. Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2015; Onali et al., 2016), we focus 
on very short event windows, in order to limit the problem of overlapping events; 
we focus on the following event windows: (-1; +1), (0,+1) and (0,0). We then 
calculate the Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) as the mean of our 
CAR estimates in each event window. After the calculation of CAARs, we test the 
hypothesis of a market reaction significantly different from zero. To account for the 
variance increase in ARs with respect to the estimation period during the days near 
the event, we follow the approach proposed by Mikkelson and Partch (1988) and 
then adopted in some recent studies (e.g., Harrington and Shrider, 2007), suggesting 
to use the Boehmer et al. (1991) test statistic. A recent study by Kolari and 
Pynnönnen (2010) proposes a new test statistic that modifies the one suggested by 
Boehmer et al. (1991) in order to consider possible cross-sectional correlation 
among abnormal returns.  
Table 1 reports the list of the considered events related to the CA, while 
Table 2 shows the results from the event study on each date. We have an initial total 
sample of 158 listed institutions, of which 50 banks were involved in the CA (the 
detailed composition by country is reported in Table 2, Panel A). For each date, the 
effective number of observations for the event study depends on the availability of a 
complete and liquid stock price series. Besides considering the difference between 
banks involved or not in the CA, we also focus on the distinction between banks 
registering a capital shortfall or not at the end of the procedure (gap banks were 15 
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out of 50; as in the previous case, the effective number of observations for the event 
study in each date depends on the availability of complete and liquid stock price 
series). As expected, looking at CAARs and differences in mean among different 
subgroups of banks (reported in Table 2, Panel B), it is evident that the most 
important dates are the first and the last ones.  
At the first date, 23rd October 2013, the ECB announced details for the 
comprehensive assessment procedure and disclosed the list of involved institutions. 
At this date, CAARs for banks involved are negative in all the considered event 
windows and greater in magnitude with respect to banks not involved in the CA. 
The difference in mean between the two samples is always negative and statistically 
significant, at least at the 10% confidence level. In order to understand whether this 
difference derives from the investors’ expectation of a capital shortfall for some 
banks involved, we also consider the difference between the subsamples of CA 
banks registering a capital shortfall and CA banks without a shortfall. CAARs are 
generally negative for both subgroups, but the reaction is particularly strong for 
shortfall banks, especially at the date of the announcement, when the CAAR is -
3.61%, statistically significant at the 5% confidence level even after the correction 
suggested by Kolari and Pynnönen (2010). These results suggest that investors were 
able to detect banks with a shortfall resulting from the CA already at the date when 
the beginning of the procedure was announced. On the other hand, the negative 
reaction registered also for banks without a shortfall may indicate that there was 
high uncertainty about CA results or that something else was driving market 
reactions.  
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At the second date, 3rd February 2014, the ECB announced the progress 
made with the Asset Quality Review and confirmed the use of the parameters set by 
the EBA for conducting stress tests. In this case, we do not find significant 
differences between the average market reaction of banks involved or not in the 
procedure, nor between banks with or without a shortfall. It is likely that no new 
relevant information was given to the market on this day (this is not surprising if we 
consider that the parameters for the stress tests were already disclosed by the EBA 
some days before, at the end of January). 
At the third date, 11th March 2014, the ECB published the manual for the 
Asset Quality Review. Market reaction appears to be more positive for involved 
banks, and for banks registering a capital shortfall. It is likely that interested 
investors were waiting for the final manual containing all details about a crucial 
pillar of the CA and that they were satisfied to receive this complete information, 
reducing uncertainty about the procedure. 
At the fourth date, 29th April 2014, we find a similar situation. The ECB 
communicated how capital shortfall resulting at the end of the CA must be 
addressed. The disclosure of more information about the procedure appears to be 
beneficial for banks subject to the CA, while there are no statistically significant 
differences between banks with and without a shortfall (when considering this 
second categorization, it is always worth to remember the reduced number of 
observations that may strongly impact the statistically significance of results). 
At the fifth date, 17th May 2014, the ECB published the disclosure template 
for communicating results. The average market reaction is more negative for banks 
14  
involved in the procedure, and especially for banks registering a shortfall. It is likely 
that investors were worried for these banks showing their weak financial and capital 
situation in such detailed format, very standardized and allowing a direct, easy, and 
fast comparison with main peers (and competitors). 
At the sixth date, 10th October 2014, the ECB stated that the CA results 
would be published on the 26th October 2014. The reaction is more positive for 
involved banks, and for banks registering a capital shortfall, consistently with 
previous results (i.e., interested investors seem to appreciate the reduction of 
uncertainty about operational details). 
At the seventh date, 22th October 2014, referring to media news about the 
CA, the ECB clarified that no official results would be disclosed until the 26th 
October. In general, this declaration is welcome by investors. 
Finally, on the 26th October, CA definitive results were disclosed. The 
market reaction is generally negative for banks involved in the procedure, especially 
for banks registering a capital shortfall. For the latter, considering the (0;+1) event 
window, the CAAR is -5.27%, statistically significant at the 10% confidence level 
even after the correction suggested by Kolari and Pynnönen (2010). This evidence 
suggests that investors gained new information at this date, relative to the effective 
magnitude of the capital shortfall. This point will be studied in more details in 
section 4. It is also worth noticing that CAARs are negative and show a material 
dimension also for banks without a capital shortfall in all the considered event 
windows. These findings, considered together with those related to the first 
announcement date, seem to suggest that banks involved in the CA were worried by 
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something other than the potential dilution effect due to a capital shortfall. This 
point will be studied in more details in section 5. 
 
4. Did the CA provide the market with new information reaching the objective 
of increased transparency?  
The event study analysis suggested that investors had a negative reaction both at the 
date when the CA was announced (23rd October 2013) and at the date when results 
were disclosed (26th October 2014). Looking at the difference between the 
subgroups of banks that registered a capital shortfall and those who did not, it is 
likely that investors were already able to detect weak banks in October 2013, but 
were not fully aware of the magnitude of the capital shortfall, revealed only in 
October 2014. 
In order to support this view, we focus only on banks subject to the CA and 
we adopt a methodology similar to Morgan et al. (2014). Their main idea is that 
investors, at the disclosure of results, do not react to the simple capital shortfall 
communicated for each bank, but rather to the difference between this capital 
shortfall and their expectation about it. The larger this difference is, the more 
negative is the market reaction. The main problem is how to measure investors’ 
expectations. As outlined by Morgan et al. (2014), analysts’ forecasts are quite 
sporadic and rarely available for all banks. In addition to this, as seen in the previous 
section, the ECB has discouraged the market to trust “unofficial” results. As such, 
Morgan et al. (2014) propose to proxy investors’ expectations using the market 
reaction registered in an announcement date preceding the disclosure of results, so 
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they chose the so called “clarification date”, in which the market was reassured that 
gap banks would not be nationalized. In our paper we use the first date in which the 
CA was announced, since the event study has outlined this date as the most 
significant and with the strongest difference between shortfall and no shortfall 
banks. Specifically, we assume that the market reaction on the 23rd October 2013 
(CAR𝑎𝑎) is strongly and negatively associated to the expected gap. We can then write 
the expected GAP as 𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖= 𝛿𝛿0−𝛿𝛿1𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎+𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖. Since 𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖=𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖+𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖, we can   
estimate the following model: 
𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 =  𝛿𝛿0 − 𝛿𝛿1𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 + 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,            𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖 = 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 − 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖    (1) 
where GAP is the capital shortfall resulting from the CA for the i-th bank (revealed 
to the market on 26th October 2014), CARα is the cumulated abnormal return 
registered by the i-th bank at the announcement of the procedure (on 23rd October 
2013). We posit a significant negative relationship between the expected gap and the 
CAR registered at the announcement of the procedure2. If the (negative) market 
reaction at the result date (CARr) is mainly driven by the dilution effect generated by 
the unexpected gap, we will have: 
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
𝑟𝑟 =  𝜇𝜇0 − 𝛾𝛾1[𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 − 𝐸𝐸(𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖)] + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖                 (2) 
Providing that CARα is a reasonable proxy for the expected gap yields the 
following model: 
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
𝑟𝑟 =  ?̂?𝜇0 − 𝛾𝛾�1𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 − 𝛾𝛾�2𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖      (3) 
                                                             
2 Taking into account the truncation of GAP by running a Tobit regression rather than an OLS does not affect our results. 
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where CARr is the market reaction for the i-th bank at the announcement of results, 
GAP is the capital shortfall resulting from the CA, 𝛾𝛾2 is the product of −𝛾𝛾1and −𝛿𝛿1 
and CARα is the market reaction at the announcement of the procedure. As 
illustrated in Equation (3), if investors negatively react to the difference between the 
declared and the expected gap, the coefficient for GAP and CARα will be both 
negative. The difference with Morgan et al. (2014) is apparent as in our case the 
expected sign for  CARα is negative because of the negative relation (-δ1) between 
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
𝑎𝑎 and 𝐸𝐸(𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖). Put differently, in our case the announcement of the CA is bad 
news for weak banks, while in Morgan et al. (2014) the clarification date is good 
news for weak banks since stock market participants were reassured that gap banks 
would not be nationalized. 
Table 3 reports results for estimating model (1) and (3) using different event 
windows. Results from equation (1), shown in Panel A, demonstrate that the capital 
shortfall registered for each bank3 is negatively related to the market reaction at the 
announcement date. The coefficient for CARα is negative and statistically significant 
at the 10% confidence level or less in two out of three specifications. The model also 
includes a dummy, named Control, identifying four banks (Eurobank, National Bank 
of Greece, Nova Ljublijanska bank, and Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor) that 
registered a shortfall, but were in special situations (e.g., State guarantees, 
restructuring plans, etc.) for which there was no need for capital raising measures 
(see ECB, 2014, p. 10). The R-squared ranges from 27.9% to 43.3%, similarly to the 
one obtained by Morgan et al. (2014). This supports the idea that, on the 23rd 
                                                             
3 It is measured in basis points. In addition, all variables included in the model are standardized. 
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October 2013, investors were already able to predict which banks would register a 
capital shortfall during the CA.  
Results from equation (3), are shown in Panel B. Conditioned by existing 
expectations, a larger declared gap means a stronger dilution effect; consistently, the 
coefficient for GAP is negative in all models (statistically significant at the 10% 
confidence level or less in all specifications). These findings provide evidence in 
support of H1, confirming that investors were already able to detect weak banks at 
the announcement date, but the CA produced new valuable information clarifying 
the magnitude of the capital shortfall. 
An interesting point is that CARα enters the model with a positive coefficient 
(statistically significant at the 5% confidence level or less in all specifications). This 
shows a positive correlation between the market reaction at the announcement date 
and at the disclosure of results, i.e., banks that were already identified as weak at the 
beginning of the procedure registered a worse stock price reaction also at the final 
date. In other words, the expected gap does not weaken the negative market reaction 
to the effective capital shortfall, but reinforces it. This suggests that investors 
penalized weak banks twice: once at the time of the CA launch and then at the time 
of the disclosure of CA results. This is apparently surprising. As in Morgan et al. 
(2014), one might expect that CARs at the disclosure of results should reflect only 
the unexpected portion of the shortfall: however, this is true only if the capital 
shortfall is the only driver of market reaction. In our case, differently from Morgan 
et al. (2014) that analyze the US banking industry, something else is worrying the 
investors (the SSM launch) producing an amplified negative reaction for banks 
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confirmed as weak by the final CA results. This result is consistent with the 
peculiarity of the CA that is not only a regulatory stress test, but also the initial stage 
of a new supervisory model, probably perceived as more intrusive with respect to 
the past (see also Fiordelisi, Ricci, Stentella, forthcoming). Finally, it is worth 
noticing that some banks raised capital between December 2013 and September 
2014, even before the disclosure of CA results. If we include a measure for these 
recapitalization interventions in our second model, it takes a positive coefficient (as 
expected), but it is not statistically significant, probably due to the fact that the 
capital raised was generally unable to cover the entire shortfall4. 
 
5. Were investors reassured by the CA and the launch of the SSM? 
Results from previous sections show a negative market reaction both at the 
announcement date and at the disclosure of results, even for banks not reporting a 
capital shortfall in the Comprehensive Assessment. Furthermore, we also find some 
evidence that the capital shortfall (expected and then declared) is not the only driver 
of market reaction. In this final step, we try to understand whether investors were 
worried by something else, i.e., by possible supervisory inconsistencies and by the 
adoption of a more intrusive approach deriving from a Single Supervisory 
Mechanism. To this aim, we focus on the 4th November 2014, when the market had 
already been fully informed about the output of the CA and the launching of the 
SSM was announced. In this way, we try to neutralize the CA effect and to isolate 
investors’ expectation about the future of the SSM. As in section 3, we distinguish 
                                                             
4 Results are available from the authors upon request. 
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between “treated banks” (i.e., banks subject to the SSM) and “untreated banks” (i.e., 
banks not subject to the SSM). In this respect, it is important to outline that on 4th 
September 2014 the ECB published a final list of significant institutions excluding 
some banks involved in the CA (e.g., Credito Emiliano in Italy). Since these banks 
will maintain their national supervisors, but have been considered as significant for 
the greatest part of the process up to now, we consider all results of this section, 
including them in the sample of “treated”5banks. 
First of all, we consider results from an event study analysis on the 4th 
November 2014, summarized in Table 4. It is evident that both treated and untreated 
banks exhibit a negative average reaction, but the magnitude is larger for treated 
banks. We also observe a significant difference between the two subgroups in the 
shortest event window, i.e., exactly at the date of the announcement (0;0). This 
evidence, together with the negative reaction at the disclosure of results also for 
banks involved in the CA, but without a capital shortfall (see Table 2), supports the 
idea that investors were not worried only about the CA exercise (completed in 
October 2014 and with consequences already incorporated in stock prices). Is it 
possible to infer a negative treatment effect for the SSM, linked to the fear of 
regulatory inconsistency and, in particular, that ECB would prove stricter than 
national supervisors. 
In order to answer this question, we try to estimate the treatment effect of the 
direct ECB supervision considering a binary treatment variable (named as w), taking 
value 1 for treated and 0 for untreated banks. Our dependent variable is the CAR 
                                                             
5 Exclusion of these banks does not change conclusions. Results are available from the authors upon request. 
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estimated in the previous step. As outlined by Imbens and Woolridge (2009), 
experimental settings remain relatively rare in economics and policy evaluation, 
while it is more frequent to rely on observational data. The authors also recognize 
that observational data pose significant challenges in estimating causal treatment 
effects, with the exception of the special case referred to as unconfoundedness or 
selection on observables. In this case, it is possible to remove all biases in 
comparisons between treated and control units by adjusting for differences in 
observed pre-treatment variables. More in details, in our analysis, we are in a “non-
experimental” set-up, but the following elements allow us to restore randomization. 
First, the selection of banks subject to the CA is based on observable pre-treatment 
characteristics, explicitly declared by the ECB, i.e., the location of banks (in the 
EMU area) and their relative size (total assets with respect to country GDP, Res). 
Second, it is reasonable to exclude a severe problem of self-selection (i.e., 
individuals choose or not to apply for the treatment), since banks subject to the CA 
(and then to direct ECB supervision under the SSM) were selected in the EMU on 
the basis of their size, which is not a variable under management control, at least in 
the short run.  
Once the self-selection is excluded and the knowledge of the factors 
affecting the sample selection is taken into account, the condition of randomization 
is restored and it is possible to adopt a simple OLS approach, controlling for these 
factors (Cerulli, 2014).  
One might also claim that investors were penalizing treated banks for some 
of their specific features not necessarily related to the SSM, such as poor 
22  
profitability or low capitalization. In order to overcome this limitation, we estimate 
the treatment effect considering several possible confounding effects, both at the 
macro and the micro level. At the macro level, we include the level of state aid 
provided by governments to the banking sector during the financial crisis (Sta), the 
level of country wealth (measured by nominal GDP), and the level of competition in 
the banking industry (measured with the HHI index). At the micro level, we take 
into account the level of profitability (ROA) and capitalization (equity on total 
assets, ETA).  
Specifically, we run a model with idiosyncratic (or heterogeneous) average 
treatment effect. As outlined by Cerulli (2014), the benefit of this model is that it 
allows for generalization of the regression approach typically used in standard 
program evaluation by considering potentially heterogeneous response to treatment. 
From an operational point of view, the existence of this heterogeneity is considered 
by introducing interactions between the binary treatment variable and the covariates 
of interest in the outcome equation. Assuming heterogeneity in treatment response, 
the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) obtained is different from either the average 
treatment effect on treated banks (ATET) or the average treatment effect on non-
treated banks (ATENT), since the parameters ATE, ATET, and ATENT are no more 
single values, but are functions of the control variables included in the regression. 
Consequently, since each bank has its own values of these variables, we will have 
“individual specific average treatment effects”. Consistent estimates of ATE, ATET, 
and ATENT are obtained assuming the validity of the Stable Unit Treatment Value 
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Assumption (SUTVA), i.e., excluding that the treatment of a unit affects the 
outcome of another unit6.  
All variables used in the analysis are defined in Table 5, while Table 6 
presents the main summary statistics. It is possible to observe that treated and 
controls present significant differences in some variables: treated banks are located 
in countries that, on average, are richer and have guaranteed more state aids to 
financial institutions during the crisis period. Furthermore, treated banks are on 
average larger and less capitalized.  
Our main results are shown in Table7, columns (1) and (2). We provide two 
different specifications: our first specification is for the abnormal return (0;0) on 4th 
November 2014. We choose the shortest event window since it is the only one 
showing a significant difference in mean between the groups of treated and 
untreated banks in the event study (see Table 4). A second specification analyzes the 
same event window for the results date (26th October 2014). The first specification is 
our favorite, since results from the CA have already been announced and 
incorporated in stock market prices. However, findings are quite similar, and the 
following comments refer to the main specification. The investors’ reaction displays 
a negative statistically significant link with the treatment variable (w). This means 
that considering the bank characteristics that determine the treatment and other 
possible features generating heterogeneity in the treatment effect, banks subject to 
the direct supervision of the ECB were penalized by the market. It is also interesting 
to comment on the coefficients assumed by the interaction between the treatment                                                              
6All formulas for the calculation of relevant parameters are reported in a Technical Appendix available from the 
authors upon request. 
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variable and some macro or micro variables. More in details, there is some evidence 
that the treatment effect is more negative for institutions located in countries where 
the banks received more state aids as a response to the global financial crisis, 
probably because these banks were perceived as weaker and then more susceptible 
with respect to potentially stricter supervision. Conversely, investors seem to be less 
worried about the change in banking supervision when the banking system presents 
a higher level of concentration, reducing competition and then market pressures. 
Looking at micro-variables, the treatment effect appears to be more negative for 
banks with higher level of profitability, possibly corresponding to a high level of 
risk. Columns (3) and (4) report models in which we include squared terms, in order 
to investigate potential non-linear effects. The treatment variable remains negative 
and statistically significant, at least at the 10% confidence level7.  
<< INSERT TABLE 7>> 
 
By analyzing summary statistics about ATE(X), ATET(X), and ATENT(X), 
reported in Panel B, we observe that the average ATENT(X) is always negative as is 
the average ATET(X). This indicates that, considering the effect of several possible 
confounders, untreated banks would have experienced a very similar negative 
reaction with respect to treated banks if they had been subject to the same treatment. 
This reinforces the idea that the negative reaction of investors is not mainly due to 
                                                             
7 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. Most squared terms are not significant, so we prefer to 
keep the Table more parsimonious and not to show detailed coefficients. However, results are available from the 
authors upon request.  
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some specific features of the group of treated banks, but to the treatment in itself, 
supporting H2. 
 
6. Robustness checks 
In this section, we provide some robustness checks to test the reliability of results 
from our main models shown in Table 7. First, we restrict the sample in order to 
have a comparable average bank size in the subsamples of treated and controls. As 
suggested by Imbens and Woolridge (2009), the simple linear regression model is 
reliable when the variables determining the treatment are known, and the normalized 
difference of these variables between treated and controls is not too large. As it is 
possible to observe from Table 5, Panel B, the size relative to GDP is significantly 
larger for treated banks than for controls. In order to remove this significant 
difference, we drop from our analysis all controls for which the relative size is 
below the minimum value registered for treated banks. As reported in Table 8, 
Models (1) and (2), the number of observations drop from 118 to 89, but results 
remain qualitatively unaltered: our treatment variable remains negative and 
statistically significant at least at the 5% confidence level. 
Second, we have to consider the possibility that some relevant confounding 
events happened around the considered announcement dates. We search Lexis Nexis 
for relevant news in a (-5;+5) window around both the announcement of CA results 
(26 October 2014) and the official launch of the SSM (4 November 2014). We also 
draw information from the press release section of all sample banks’ institutional 
websites. We include news related to change in top management (Chief Executive 
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Officer, Chief Financial Officer, or Chief Operational Officer turnover), M&A 
deals, rating changes, and shares or bonds issuance. As we can see from Models (3) 
and (4) of Table 8, our main results remain qualitatively unaltered, with the 
coefficient for our treatment variable being negative and statistically significant at 
least at the 5% confidence level8. 
 
7.Conclusions 
In autumn 2012 the European Commission went through an epochal change in the 
European Banking supervisory system by creating a Single Supervisory Mechanism 
(SSM) led by the European Central Bank (ECB). Since November 4th 2014, the most 
significant banks in the Eurozone have fallen under the direct supervision of the 
ECB, while National Supervisory Authorities (NSAs) maintain the direct 
supervision of the remaining banks.  
The preliminary step to the launching of the SSM was a Comprehensive 
Assessment consisting of a supervisory risk assessment, an asset quality review, and 
a stress test for all the significant institutions under direct ECB supervision. This 
complex exercise aimed at increasing transparency on the condition of banks, 
applying the necessary corrective actions to their balance sheet, and building 
confidence among stakeholders. The purpose of this paper is to understand whether 
the CA reached its transparency and confidence building objectives, contributing to 
both the literature on regulatory stress tests and on the design of the supervisory 
architecture in Europe.                                                              
8 In untabulated results we also put together our two main robustness checks, running a model with similar size for treated and 
controls and no confounding events. The number of observations is significantly reduced, but our treatment variable remains 
negative and statistically significant. Results are available from the authors upon request. 
27  
The first step of our empirical analysis focuses on the market reaction at the 
announcement of the CA and at the disclosure of results, examining the difference 
between banks that register a capital shortfall and those that do not. Following the 
methodology applied by Morgan et al. (2014), we show that investors were already 
able to identify weak banks at the announcement of the procedure, but the CA 
exercise was able to produce new valuable information. This indicates that the CA 
was successful with respect to the aim of increasing transparency, confirming our 
first research hypothesis, (H1: At the announcement of the procedure, investors were 
not able to predict the magnitude of the capital shortfall revealed at the results date, 
i.e., the exercise produced valuable information for the market and reached the goal 
of increased transparency). Our results have important policy implications, since 
they confirm previous findings for the U.S also for the Euro area. (Morgan et al., 
2014). Specifically, we show that the implementation of regulatory stress tests and 
the disclosure of results were able to produce new valuable information for 
investors. In a period of severe crisis, this new information is essential to reduce 
uncertainty and restore transactions among financial institutions (Bernanke, 2013).  
The second step of our empirical analysis focuses on a treatment effect 
model comparing banks subject to direct ECB supervision and a control sample of 
banks maintaining their national supervisors. Using a regression model including 
possible confounders and allowing for treatment effect heterogeneity, we find a 
negative treatment effect for banks subject to direct ECB supervision, which were 
penalized both at the disclosure of CA results (26th October 2014) and at the official 
launch of the SSM (4th November 2014). Findings are in support of our second 
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hypothesis: H2: When the SSM was launched, investors penalized banks subject to 
the direct ECB supervision with respect to banks maintaining national supervisors.      
This adverse effect may be due to various reasons: this is unlikely to be a 
dilution effect due to expected recapitalizations following the CA results, which had 
been already incorporated in stock prices at the time of the CA disclosure (26th 
October 2014). It is more likely the effect of the investors’ expectation for a 
different supervision of banks under the ECB direct control with respect to banks 
remaining with their national supervisory authorities. More specifically, this 
suggests that investors expect a more intrusive approach by the ECB, or at least are 
worried about a possibly heterogeneous application of supervision rules for treated 
and control banks. For these reasons, at least in the short run, investors were not 
completely reassured by the CA and the launch of the SSM, so the CA declared goal 
of “building confidence” appears to have been limited by uncertainty about the 
future of supervision. 
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Table 1 
The pivotal moments of the Comprehensive Assessment 
 
This table reports the most important ECB press releases related to the CA. 
October 23, 2013 ECB starts comprehensive assessment in advance of supervisory role. The details of the procedure and the list of involved institutions are disclosed to the market 
February 03, 2014 ECB makes progress with asset quality review, and confirms stress test parameters for comprehensive assessment released by the EBA on 31 January 
March 11, 2014 ECB publishes manual for asset quality review  
April 29, 2014 ECB has today informed banks how capital shortfalls must be addressed following the comprehensive assessment. Banks are given six to nine months to cover capital shortfalls  
July 17, 2014 ECB has today presented the process for interacting with banks and the disclosure template for communicating the results of its on-going comprehensive assessment  
October 10, 2014 ECB communicates that the CA results will be published on 26 October 2014 
October 22, 2014 Statement about media reports ahead of comprehensive assessment results (no official results before 26 October 2014) 
October 26, 2014 ECB’s in-depth review shows banks need to take further action. CA detailed results for each bank are disclosed to the market 
November 04, 2014 SSM starts 
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Table 2 
Investors’ reaction to the events related to the Comprehensive Assessment 
Panel A - Sample composition by country 
This table reports the origin of all listed European banks included in our event study. 
 
Banks 
involved in the 
CA (treated) 
Banks not involved 
in the CA 
(untreated) 
Total 
Austria 4 4 8 
Belgium 2 
 
2 
Bulgaria 
 
6 6 
Croatia 
 
11 11 
Cyprus 2 1 3 
Czech Republic 1 1 
Denmark 
 
24 24 
Finland 
 
2 2 
France 5 
 
5 
Germany 3 5 8 
Greece 4 3 7 
Hungary 
 
1 1 
Ireland 2 
 
2 
Italy 12 4 16 
Lithuania 
 
1 1 
Luxembourg 1 1 
Malta 2 2 4 
Netherlands 1 2 3 
Poland 
 
15 15 
Portugal 2 2 4 
Romania 
 
3 3 
Slovakia 2 3 5 
Slovenia 1 1 2 
Spain 8 
 
8 
Sweden 
 
4 4 
United Kingdom 12 12 
Total                         50 108 158 
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Panel B – Event study results 
This table illustrates the descriptive statistics of Cumulated Abnormal Returns estimated over the main ECB press releases relative to the Comprehensive Assessment. We report Daily Abnormal 
Returns obtained using the market model with a 252-day estimation period. The market portfolio is represented by the MSCI World Index. The statistical significance of Cumulated Average Abnormal 
Returns (CAAR) is tested using the Boehmer et al. (1991) procedure to capture the event-induced increase in returns volatility. CAARs in bold are those that remain statistically significant also 
considering the adjustment suggested by Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) in order to account for possible cross sectional correlation of abnormal returns. Source: Authors’ elaboration on European Central 
Bank and Datastream. 
 
 A) Banks involved in the CA B) Banks not involved in the CA 
A  
vs B A1) Banks with a shortfall A2) Banks without a shortfall 
A1 vs 
A2 
23/10/2013 CAAR Z-stat P-value % Pos CAAR Z-stat P-value % Pos Diff. CAAR Z-stat P-value % Pos CAAR Z-stat P-value % Pos Diff. 
(-1,1) -1.77% -0.8144 0.415406 24.44% 0.53% 0.5541 0.579501 57.14% neg* 0.03% -0.7669 0.443158 35.71% -2.58% -0.7638 0.445015 44.44% n.s. 
(0,1) -1.27% -0.8195 0.412520 35.56% 0.52% 0.5554 0.578616 55.84% neg** -2.20% -1.5928 0.111209 21.43% -0.84% -0.4959 0.619962 33.33% n.s. 
(0,0) -2.08% -1.5202 0.128464 13.33% -0.25% -1.1172 0.263892 50.65% neg*** -3.61% -2.2785 0.022694 7.14% -1.38% -1.0916 0.275029 11.11% neg.*** 
03/02/2014 CAAR Z-stat P-value % Pos CAAR Z-stat P-value % Pos Diff. CAAR Z-stat P-value % Pos CAAR Z-stat P-value % Pos Diff. 
(-1,1) 1.41% 0.8583 0.390727 73.33% 0.02% 0.6220 0.533942 54.32% n.s. 1.48% 0.9491 0.342551 71.43% 1.38% 0.7189 0.472197 88.89% n.s. 
(0,1) 1.03% 0.7251 0.468396 75.56% 0.21% 0.7125 0.476172 56.79% n.s. 0.67% 0.4124 0.680022 71.43% 1.19% 0.8383 0.401842 88.89% n.s. 
(0,0) -0.42% -0.4043 0.685987 46.67% 0.67% 1.8789 0.060258 69.14% n.s. -1.08% -0.5304 0.595813 50.00% -0.12% -0.2975 0.766052 66.67% n.s. 
11/03/2014 CAAR Z-stat P-value % Pos CAAR Z-stat P-value % Pos Diff. CAAR Z-stat P-value % Pos CAAR Z-stat P-value % Pos Diff. 
(-1,1) 2.21% 0.4057 0.684961 62.22% -0.63% -1.6060 0.108284 32.50% pos** 5.37% 1.9520 0.050936 85.71% 0.79% 0.0854 0.931944 100.00% pos** 
(0,1) 0.88% 0.0372 0.970323 44.44% -0.73% -1.6425 0.100482 35.00% pos * 3.25% 1.3782 0.168128 71.43% -0.18% -0.2434 0.807706 88.89% n.s. 
(0,0) 1.53% 0.4691 0.639005 55.56% 0.14% 0.4235 0.671961 53.75% pos* 3.02% 1.2065 0.227620 71.43% 0.86% 0.2685 0.788328 77.78% n.s. 
29/04/2014 CAAR Z-stat P-value % Pos CAAR Z-stat P-value % Pos Diff. CAAR Z-stat P-value % Pos CAAR Z-stat P-value % Pos Diff. 
(-1,1) -0.58% -0.4725 0.636547 45.65% -0.44% -0.2479 0.804186 40.24% n.s. 1.23% 0.3301 0.741349 64.29% -1.37% -0.6467 0.517815 77.78% n.s. 
(0,1) 0.11% 0.0326 0.973974 50.00% 0.26% 0.6012 0.547705 56.10% n.s. 1.43% 0.5400 0.589218 71.43% -0.47% -0.1256 0.900048 77.78% n.s. 
(0,0) 0.83% 1.2775 0.201434 78.26% -0.08% 0.0490 0.960895 51.22% pos** 1.34% 1.4583 0.144767 85.71% 0.60% 1.0870 0.277040 88.89% n.s. 
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17/07/2014 CAAR Z-stat P-value % Pos CAAR Z-stat P-value % Pos Diff. CAAR Z-stat P-value % Pos CAAR Z-stat P-value % Pos Diff. 
(-1,1) 0.21% 0.2808 0.778868 59.57% -0.09% -0.1015 0.919126 49.40% n.s. 0.23% 0.3250 0.745203 53.33% 0.20% 0.2418 0.808953 44.44% n.s. 
(0,1) -1.29% -0.8244 0.409715 23.40% -0.10% -0.8474 0.396780 44.58% neg*** -1.75% -1.8508 0.064198 26.67% -1.08% -0.5814 0.560955 33.33% n.s. 
(0,0) -0.18% -0.4430 0.657736 31.91% 0.53% 0.8020 0.422555 55.42% neg* -0.69% -1.2527 0.210326 26.67% 0.05% -0.2202 0.825715 33.33% n.s. 
10/10/2014 CAAR Z-stat P-value % Pos CAAR Z-stat P-value % Pos Diff. CAAR Z-stat P-value % Pos CAAR Z-stat P-value % Pos Diff. 
(-1,1) 3.38% 1.5101 0.131008 82.22% 0.02% 0.3189 0.749813 45.68% pos*** 4.36% 1.7379 0.082233 85.71% 2.93% 1.2813 0.200103 75.00% n.s. 
(0,1) 2.49% 1.3628 0.172944 82.22% 0.01% 0.1796 0.857468 50.62% pos*** 2.95% 1.7086 0.087531 85.71% 2.28% 1.1368 0.255642 75.00% n.s. 
(0,0) 1.14% 0.8389 0.401514 75.56% -0.02% 0.0711 0.943295 51.85% pos** 1.40% 1.1292 0.258804 64.29% 1.02% 0.6645 0.506375 62.50% n.s. 
22/10/2014 CAAR Z-stat P-value % Pos CAAR Z-stat P-value % Pos Diff. CAAR Z-stat P-value % Pos CAAR Z-stat P-value % Pos Diff. 
(-1,1) 2.48% 1.7506 0.080014 84.44% 1.15% 1.7308 0.083496 65.43% pos** 2.86% 1.2677 0.204915 78.57% 2.31% 1.7737 0.076107 75.00% n.s. 
(0,1) 0.89% 0.8387 0.401634 68.89% 0.43% 0.9067 0.364566 55.56% n.s. 0.20% -0.1531 0.878348 35.71% 1.19% 1.2005 0.229953 50.00% n.s. 
(0,0) 0.94% 1.1361 0.255919 75.56% 0.79% 1.9477 0.051449 69.14% n.s. 0.67% 0.2989 0.765052 64.29% 1.07% 1.6600 0.096915 75.00% n.s. 
2610/2014 CAAR Z-stat P-value % Pos CAAR Z-stat P-value % Pos Diff. CAAR Z-stat P-value % Pos CAAR Z-stat P-value % Pos Diff. 
(-1,1) -2.37% -1.1969 0.231364 31.11% -0.72% -1.2170 0.223605 30.86% neg** -3.48% -1.2454 0.212983 28.57% -1.87% -1.0335 0.301355 25.00% n.s. 
(0,1) -3.02% -1.6194 0.105354 17.78% -0.25% -0.5300 0.596112 46.91% neg*** -5.27% -1.6480 0.099359 14.29% -2.01% -1.5790 0.114332 25.00% n.s. 
(0,0) -2.50% -1.3577 0.174567 26.67% 0.07% 0.0613 0.951142 54.32% neg*** -4.54% -1.3634 0.172741 35.71% -1.57% -1.3334 0.182392 37.50% n.s. 
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Table 3 
Did the CA produced new information for the market? 
Panel A: CAR at the announcement date as a proxy for the expected gap.  
This panel shows results from running the model represented by equation (1), in which the 
capital shortfall resulted from the CA is regressed on the market reaction at the announcement 
of the procedure. Control is a dummy variable identifying four banks (Eurobank, National 
Bank of Greece, Nova Ljublijanska bank, and Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor) that registered 
a shortfall, but were in special situations (e.g., State guarantees, restructuring plans, etc.) for 
which there was no need for capital raising measures (see ECB, 2014, p. 10). 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Y= GAP (0;0) (0;1) (1;1) 
        
CARα -0.530*** -0.298* 0.128 
 
(0.196) (0.175) (0.142) 
Control 1.801** 1.751* 1.599* 
 
(0.868) (0.935) (0.845) 
Constant -0.349*** -0.219** -0.0945 
 
(0.0992) (0.101) (0.118) 
    Observations 45 45 45 
R-squared 0.433 0.315 0.279 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
Panel B: CAR at the results date as a reaction to the unexpected gap.  
This panel shows results from running the model represented by equation (3), in which the 
market reaction at the disclosure of results is regressed on the capital shortfall resulting from 
the CA and the CAR at the announcement date (as a proxy for the expected gap).  
  (1) (2) (3) 
Y= CARr (0;0) (0;1) (1;1) 
        
GAP -0.761* -0.827** -0.727** 
 
(0.382) (0.360) (0.302) 
CARα 0.553** 0.446** 0.598*** 
 
(0.233) (0.216) (0.147) 
Control 2.323** 2.632** 1.196 
 
(1.104) (1.132) (0.880) 
Constant -0.393** -0.480*** -0.201 
 
(0.183) (0.167) (0.176) 
    Observations 44 44 44 
R-squared 0.455 0.456 0.434 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4 
Investors’ reaction to the launch of the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of Cumulated Abnormal Returns registered around 4 November 2014. We report Daily 
Abnormal Returns obtained using the market model with a 252-day estimation period. The market portfolio is represented by the 
MSCI World Index. The statistical significance of Cumulated Average Abnormal Returns (CAAR) is tested using the Boehmer et 
al. (1991) procedure to capture the event-induced increase in returns volatility. CAARs in bold are those that remain statistically 
significant also considering the adjustment suggested by Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) in order to account for possible cross 
sectional correlation of abnormal returns. Source: Authors’ elaboration on European Central Bank and Datastream. 
 
 
 Banks involved in the CA (treated) Banks not involved in the CA (untreated)  
04/11/2014 CAAR Z-stat P-value % Pos CAAR Z-stat P-value % Pos Diff. 
(-1,1) -0.79% -0.6141 0.539132 28.89% -0.73% -1.5384 0.123952 34.57% n.s. 
(0,1) -0.80% -0.7785 0.436278 31.11% -0.93% -1.3867 0.165530 35.80% n.s. 
(0,0) -1.55% -1.5589 0.119024 22.22% -0.70% -1.7736 0.076123 39.51% neg** 
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Table 5 
Variables definition  
 
This table defines the variables used in the treatment effect analysis and the sources of data. 
Variables Symbol Definition and calculation method Source 
Treatment Effect w A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the bank is under the ECB direct supervision and 0 otherwise ECB 
Industry 
concentration HHI The natural logarithm of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ECB 
State Aids Sta The amount of resources devoted to recapitalization and asset relief purposes over the period 2008-2012, as a percentage of 2012 GDP. 
European 
Commission 
GDP GDP The nominal value of the country GDP in EUR million World Bank 
Euro Area EMU A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the bank is in one of the Euro area countries and 0 otherwise ECB 
Relative size ReS The ratio between bank total assets and country GDP  Bankscope and World Bank. 
Return on Assets ROA The ratio between pre-tax profits and total assets. This variable measures the bank profitability, avoiding the effect of fiscal differences among countries Bankscope 
Capitalization ETA 
The ratio between equity and total assets. This variable measures the bank 
capitalization without considering regulatory risk-weights for different asset 
classes 
Bankscope 
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Table 6 
Summary statistics  
This table reports the sample mean and standard deviation for all the continuous variables used in the treatment 
analysis to investigate investors’ reaction during the SSM launch. The construction of variables is explained in 
Table 5. All values refer to 2013, the year before the public launch of the Single Supervisory Mechanism. 
 
 
 
Banks involved in the CA 
(treated) 
Banks not involved in the CA 
(untreated) Total sample 
Treated vs. 
untreated  
 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Diff. in mean 
 ReS 0.3924 0.3364 0.1690 0.3828 0.2542 0.3803 0.2235*** 
Sta 6.6336 9.1793 3.1729 3.6721 4.4926 6.5449 3.4607** 
GDP 1,090,000 807,000 633,000 753,000 808,000 803,000 457,000*** 
HHI 803.8444 559.9944 889.7260 496.2553 856.9746 520.8052 -85.8816 
ROA 0.0004 0.0131 0.0048 0.0131 0.0031 0.0133 -0.0045* 
ETA 0.0643 0.0207 0.1074 0.0941 0.0910 0.0778 -0.0431*** 
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Table 7 
The Single Supervisory Treatment effect 
This table reports the results of a regression in which the dependent variable is the abnormal return around ECB press 
announcement related to the launch of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). Our treatment binary variable, w, distinguishes 
between treated and untreated banks. We control for location in the Euro Area (EMU), relative size (ReS, i.e., the ratio of total 
assets over country GDP), the amount of state aids (Sta, i.e., the amount of resources devoted to recapitalization and asset relief 
purposes over the period 2008-2012, as a percentage of 2012 GDP), the nominal GDP of the country (GDP), the level of industry 
concentration (HHI, i.e. the Herfindhal-Hirshman index), the bank’s profitability (ROA), and capitalization (ETA).We assume a 
heterogeneous response, so that the average treatment effect (ATE) is different from either the average treatment effect on treated 
(ATET) and the average treatment effect on non-treated (ATENT). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Source: Authors’ 
elaboration on European Central Bank, Bankscope, and Datastream 
Panel A: coefficient estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 4 November 2014 26 October 2014 4 November 2014 26 October 2014 
     
W -0.01577* -0.03038*** -0.01734* -0.02143** 
 (0.00833) (0.00923) (0.00923) (0.01042) 
EMU 0.00335 0.00767 0.00247 0.00267 
 (0.00501) (0.00542) (0.00791) (0.00817) 
ReS 0.00105 -0.00072 0.00576 0.00125 
 (0.00119) (0.00116) (0.00479) (0.00530) 
Sta 0.01130*** 0.01309** 0.01035** 0.01963*** 
 (0.00353) (0.00636) (0.00454) (0.00638) 
GDP -0.00685*** -0.00978*** -0.00989** -0.02414*** 
 (0.00246) (0.00264) (0.00493) (0.00561) 
HHI -0.00749*** -0.00179 -0.00982* -0.00863 
 (0.00244) (0.00191) (0.00551) (0.00526) 
ROA 0.00817** 0.00932*** 0.00791* 0.00786** 
 (0.00387) (0.00305) (0.00416) (0.00346) 
ETA -0.00196** -0.00001 0.00175 -0.00093 
 (0.00090) (0.00092) (0.00518) (0.00583) 
w*ReS -0.00110 0.01044 -0.00432 0.01094 
 (0.00411) (0.00733) (0.00505) (0.00936) 
w*Sta -0.01573*** -0.01064 -0.01590** -0.01391 
 (0.00442) (0.00715) (0.00638) (0.01277) 
w*GDP 0.00522 -0.00253 0.00381 -0.00050 
 (0.00589) (0.00734) (0.00611) (0.00689) 
w*HHI 0.01544*** -0.01231 0.01418*** -0.00984 
 (0.00435) (0.00923) (0.00533) (0.01057) 
w*ROA -0.02266** 0.02516** -0.01560* 0.01039 
 (0.00988) (0.01231) (0.00881) (0.01249) 
w*ETA -0.00748 -0.00456 -0.01850 0.01129 
 (0.02347) (0.03743) (0.02357) (0.04418) 
     
Squared terms NO NO YES YES 
     
Constant -0.00688** -0.00075 -0.00971*** -0.00184 
 (0.00264) (0.00273) (0.00341) (0.00384) 
     
Observations 118 118 118 118 
R-squared 0.24452 0.38503 0.28170 0.44155  
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Panel B:  Market Model Abnormal Returns – Summary statistics of ATE(X), ATET(X), ATENT(X) for 
Models (1) and (2) 
4 /11/2014 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ATE_x 118 -0.01577 0.024064 -0.10536 0.06681 
ATET_x 45 -0.01534 0.026014 -0.10481 0.06681 
ATENT_x 73 -0.01603 0.022962 -0.10536 0.059388  
26/10/2014 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ATE_x 118 -0.03038 0.027217 -0.14407 0.019142 
ATET_x 45 -0.03174 0.025607 -0.1081 0.003046 
ATENT_x 73 -0.02954 0.028305 -0.14407 0.019142  
 
44  
Table 8 
The Single Supervisory Treatment effect – Robustness checks 
This table reports the results for the same regression models shown in Table 7, with the following adjustments: Models (1) and 
(2) are run reducing the sample in order to have a comparable bank size in the subgroups of treated and control banks. Models (3) 
and (4) are run excluding banks with significant confounding events (e.g., M&As or CEO turnovers) around the announcement 
date. We control for location in the Euro Area (EMU), relative size (ReS, i.e., the ratio of total assets over country GDP), the 
amount of state aids (Sta, i.e., the amount of resources devoted to recapitalization and asset relief purposes over the period 2008-
2012, as a percentage of 2012 GDP), the nominal GDP of the country (GDP), the level of industry concentration (HHI, i.e. the 
Herfindhal-Hirshman index), the bank’s profitability (ROA), and capitalization (ETA).We assume a heterogeneous response, so 
that the average treatment effect (ATE) is different from either the average treatment effect on treated banks (ATET) and the 
average treatment effect on non-treated banks (ATENT). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Source: Authors’ elaboration 
on European Central Bank, Bankscope, and Datastream 
 
 (1) (2) (5) (6) 
 4 November 2014 26 October 2014 4 November 2014 26 October 2014 
     
W -0.01558** -0.01623** -0.01761** -0.02792** 
 (0.00725) (0.00752) (0.00808) (0.01066) 
EMU 0.00243 -0.00820 0.00197 0.00782 
 (0.00575) (0.00637) (0.00507) (0.00532) 
ReS 0.00119 -0.00178 0.00117 -0.00005 
 (0.00123) (0.00208) (0.00122) (0.00116) 
Sta 0.00744** 0.01816*** 0.01231*** 0.01386** 
 (0.00307) (0.00673) (0.00339) (0.00613) 
GDP 0.00202 -0.01829*** -0.00741*** -0.00868*** 
 (0.00295) (0.00366) (0.00244) (0.00258) 
HHI -0.00517** 0.00012 -0.00959*** -0.00052 
 (0.00226) (0.00223) (0.00196) (0.00148) 
ROA 0.00180 0.00817* 0.00731* 0.00853*** 
 (0.00264) (0.00450) (0.00394) (0.00286) 
ETA 0.00527 -0.00601 -0.00219*** 0.00017 
 (0.00337) (0.00573) (0.00078) (0.00085) 
w*ReS -0.00123 0.01150 -0.00224 0.00785 
 (0.00421) (0.00770) (0.00490) (0.01035) 
w*Sta -0.01187*** -0.01571** -0.01562*** -0.01459* 
 (0.00411) (0.00752) (0.00402) (0.00782) 
w*GDP -0.00365 0.00597 0.00248 -0.00110 
 (0.00623) (0.00792) (0.00636) (0.01066) 
w*HHI 0.01312*** -0.01422 0.01593*** -0.00668 
 (0.00433) (0.00952) (0.00351) (0.00811) 
w*ROA -0.01628* 0.02632** -0.00686 0.00799 
 (0.00968) (0.01302) (0.00693) (0.01867) 
w*ETA -0.01471 0.00143 -0.02413 0.00059 
 (0.02427) (0.03877) (0.02447) (0.05233) 
Constant -0.00372* 0.00360 -0.00752*** -0.00157 
 (0.00201) (0.00346) (0.00273) (0.00280) 
     
Observations 89 89 104 99 
R-squared 0.28216 0.42571 0.27173 0.24138 
 
